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COMMENTS
IMPACT OF QUALITY PROGRAMMING ON
FCC LICENSING
Quality and content of program service have long been the
primary criteria for issuing broadcast licenses.' Shortly follow-
ing its creation by the Communications Act of 1934,2 the Fed-
eral Communications Commission officially recognized its duty
to consider the "character and quality of the service to be ren-
1. Quality and content of program service have been emphasized as criteria
for issuing new or renewal broadcast radio licenses since the Radio Act of 1927.
Unity School of Christianity v. FRC, 69 F.2d 570, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ("as
grounds for its decision, the Commission held that Station KFH had rendered
good public service") ; Brahy v. FRC, 59 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ("there
was not a sufficient showing made as to the character of the service being ren-
dered by the applicant station") ; Woodman of The World Life Ins. Ass'n v. FRC,
57 F.2d 420, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ("the respective stations have performed use-
ful public service, and doubtless can continue to do so") ; Chicago Federation of
Labor v. FRC, 41 F.2d 422, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ("it has always rendered and
continues to render admirable public service") ; Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v.
FRC, 37 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ("WCBD's application was rightly
denied. This conclusion is based upon the comparatively limited public service
rendered by the station.") ; City of New York v. FRC, 36 F.2d 115, 117 (D.C.
Cir. 1929) ("the latter station . . . has won the public esteem by the high char-
acter of its service").
2. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1958) : "For the purpose of regulating interstate and for-
eign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far
as possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of
promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio com-
munication, and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this
policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and
by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce
in wire and radio communication, there is hereby created a commission to be known
as the 'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall be constituted as here-
inafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
chapter."
47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (Supp. III, 1958) : "The Federal Communications Com-
mission . . . shall be composed of seven commissioners appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, one of whom the President
shall designate as chairman." 47 U.S.C. § 154(b), (c) (1958), as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 154(b), (c) (Supp. III, 1958) pertain to qualifications and terms of
office of the Commissioners. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1958) enumerates the chair-
man's duties and prescribes the procedure to be followed in the event of a vacancy
in the office of the chairman.
3. In re McGlashan, 2 F.C.C. 145, 149 (1935) : "Section 309(a) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 is an exact restatement of Section 11 of the Radio Act
of 1927. . . . The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
the case of KFKB Broadcasting Association Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission,
60 App. D.C. 79 [1931], held that under Section 11 of the Radio Act of 1927 the
Radio Commission was necessarily called upon to consider the character and qual-
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dered ' 3 before issuing licenses to broadcasters. 4  The Commis-
sion is authorized to grant licenses to broadcast stations for a
period not to exceed three years 5 if it finds that the "public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby";' how-
ever, it is prohibited from censoring communications or inter-
fering with the right of free speech.7 The Commission is also
authorized to revoke licenses or construction permits and to
issue cease and desist orders when certain provisions of the act
or any of the Commission's rules or regulations authorized by
the act are violated.8
ity of the service to be rendered and that in considering an application for renewal
an important consideration is the past conduct of the applicant.
"Among other reasons why the Commission designated each of the foregoing
applications for hearing was the following: 'To determine the nature and character
of program service rendered by this station . . . '."
4. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958) : "It is the purpose of this chapter, among other
things, to maintain control of the United States over all the channels of interstate
and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but
not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses
granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. No person shall
use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications
or signals by radio ... except under and in accordance with this chapter and with
a license in that behalf granted under . . .this chapter."
5. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (Supp. III,
1958) : "No license granted for the operation of a broadcasting station shall be
for a longer term than three years . . . . [T]he Commission may by rule prescribe
the period or periods for which licenses shall be granted and renewed for partic-
ular classes of stations, but the Commission may not adopt or follow any rule
which would preclude it, in any case involving a station of a particular class,
from granting or renewing a license for a shorter period than that prescribed for
stations of such class if, in its judgment, public interest, convenience, or necessity
would be served by such action."
See In re Kord, Inc., 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2038 (U.S. July 21, 1961), (license was
granted for a one-year period to a license renewal applicant).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1958) : "The Commission, if public convenience, inter-
est, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this chapter,
shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chap-
ter." Id. § 308(a) : "The Commission may grant construction permits and sta-
tion licenses, or modifications or renewals thereof, only upon written application
therefor received by it." 47 U.S.C. §309(a) (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(a) (Supp. III, 1958) : "Subject to the provisions of this section, the Com-
mission shall determine, in the case of each application filed with it to which
section 308 of this title applies, whether the public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served by the granting of such application, and, if the Commis-
sion, upon examination of such application and upon consideration of such other
matters as [it] may officially notice, shall find that public interest, convenience,
and necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall grant such applica-
tion." (Emphasis added.) Note that "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
is used in Section 307(a), supra. See note 59 infra.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1958) : "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or
construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio com-
munications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or con-
dition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communication."
8. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (Supp. III,
1958) authorizes the Commission to revoke station licenses and construction per-
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Although the Commission has stated it does not wish to
formulate any policy violative of the Communications Act cen-
sorship provision or the first amendment guarantee of free
speech, 9 it clearly intends to fulfill its responsibility for quality
programming. 10 Chairman Minow of the FCC has unequivocally
voiced his dissatisfaction with the caliber of programming, par-
ticularly in the television industry." In view of broad new pol-
mits. Subsection (b) authorizes the issuance of cease and desist orders. In cer-
tain instances the Commission is empowered to suspend licenses. 47 U.S.C. § 303
(m) (1958). Id. § 303(a), (b), (c), (g), (i), (in), and (r) deal with the more
important powers and duties of the Commission.
9. FCC, Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25
Fed. Reg. 7293 (July 29, 1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Report]: "Although
the Commission must determine whether the total program service of broadcasters
is reasonably responsive to the interests and needs of the public they serve, it may
not condition the grant, denial or revocation of a broadcast license upon its own
subjective determination of what is or is not a good program. To do so would 'lay
a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.'
[Quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)]."
"It must . . . be observed that this Commission conscientiously believes that
it should make no policy or take any action which would violate the letter or the
spirit of the censorship prohibitions of Section 326 of the Communications Act."
Ibid. In speaking of "fundamental principles which guide" him, the Chairman of
the FCC said: "I am unalterably opposed to governmental censorship. There will
be no suppression of programming which does not meet with bureaucratic tastes.
Censorship strikes at the taproot of our free society." Address by Chairman
Minow, Federal Communications Commission, National Association of Broadcast-
ers Annual Convention 1961, 107 Cong. Rec. 7793 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Address].
10. 1960 Report 7293: "In view of the fact that a broadcaster is required to
program his station in the public interest, convenience and necessity, it follows
despite the limitations of the First Amendment and section 326 of the Act, that
his freedom to program is not absolute. The Commission does not conceive that
it is barred by the Constitution or by statute from exercising any responsibility
with respect to programming. It does conceive that the manner or extent of the
exercise of such responsibility can introduce constitutional or statutory questions.
It readily concedes that it is precluded from examining a program for taste or
content, unless the recognized exceptions to censorship apply; for example, obscen-
ity, profanity, indecency, programs inciting to riots, programs designed or induc-
ing toward the commission of crime, lotteries, etc."
At a recent symposium on freedom and responsibility in broadcasting Mr.
Minow commented: "When the Commission, in discharging public-interest respon-
sibilities, challenges such operations [those designed "to get the greatest financial
return possible out of . . . investment" rather than "to operate in the public
interest"] the first, almost reflex reaction is the cry of 'censorship.' " He then
asked: "What shall we do? Surrender to the men who 'want provocative pro-
grams that don't provoke anybody'?" His answer: "No-we are not going to
surrender in our efforts." Minow, The Public Interest, in FREEDOM AND RESPON-
SIBLhITY IN BROADCASTING 30, 31 (Coons ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Public
Interest].
In his first public address after becoming Chairman of the FCC, Mr. Minow
said: "We intend to move- and as you know, indeed the FCC was rapidly mov-
ing in other new areas before the new administration arrived in Washington."
Address 7793.
11. "[W]hen television is bad, nothing is worse. I invite you to sit down in
front of your television set when your station goes on the air and stay there with-
out a book, magazine, newspaper, profit and loss sheet, or rating book to distract
you- and keep your eyes glued to that set until the station signs off. I can assure
you that you will observe a vast wasteland." Address at 7792.
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icies likely to be asserted by the FCC to correct what the Chair-
man considers the "vast wasteland" of programming, this Com-
ment will examine the serious and delicate constitutional ques-
tions that are imminent, discussing them in terms of present
constitutional law and administrative practices.
FCC regulation of radio and television broadcasting embraces
denial of licenses by application of rules formulated by the Com-
mission, rule-making, issuance of cease and desist orders, and
pronouncements of policy to which broadcasters often conform
through fear of losing their licenses.
MODES OF REGULATION
Denial of Licenses
The most direct means of FCC regulation of broadcasting is
denial of initial and renewal licenses, based upon rules formu-
lated to determine whether applicants meet the statutory cri-
terion of serving the "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity." If a license is denied for failure to meet a standard or
requirement promulgated by rule, the applicant can obtain judi-
cial review of the Commission's decision. 12 Judgment on appeal
is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court upon writ of
certiorari.12
Rule-making
Regulation of broadcasting is also accomplished by rule-
making. Broadcasters must comply with officially promulgated
rules or lose their licenses on renewal application. Their alter-
native is to challenge the rule they choose to disregard before
license renewal time, for judicial review is equally available on
"Some say the public interest is merely what interests the public. I disagree."
Ibid. ,
"There are many people in this great country and you [the broadcasters] must
serve all of us. You will get no argument from me if you say that, given a choice
between a western and a symphony, more people will watch the western....
[YJour obligations are not satisfied if you look only to popularity as a test of
what to broadcast .... You must provide a wider range of choices, more diversity,
more alternatives. It is not enough to cater to the Nation's whims-you must
also serve the Nation's needs." Id. at 7793. (Emphasis added.)
12. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), (b) (1958). Appeals from decisions and orders of
the Commission are taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.
13. Id. § 402(j) : "The court's judgment shall be final, subject, however, to
review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari on
petition therefor under section 1254 of Title 28, by the appellant, by the Commis-
sion, or by any interested party intervening in the appeal, or by certification by
the court pursuant to the provisions of that section."
[Vol. XXIII
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challenge of officially promulgated rules.14 An unsuccessful chal-
lenge of a rule in this event does not result in loss of license.
Cease and Desist Orders
While a license is in effect, the Commission may order the
broadcaster to cease and desist from any violation of the act,
rules and regulations, or from failing "to operate substantially
as set forth in a license." 15 If a broadcaster is ordered to cease
and desist, he has a right to judicial review by appeal.16 If the
licensee loses on appeal, he may retain his license by adhering
to the final judgment, for only if he fails to observe a final cease
and desist order will his license be revoked. 1'7
The Commission has never issued a cease and desist order
for the probable reason that it prefers to deny license renewals
to broadcasters who neither challenge nor comply with official-
ly promulgated rules.
Policy Pronouncements
The Commission exerts substantial control over program-
ming by a means more subtle than rule-making or issuance of
orders. Policy pronouncements' 8 in dicta, speeches, and an-
nouncements, recently dubbed "regulation by lifted eyebrow"' 9
14. Suits to enjoin enforcement of "Chain Broadcasting Regulations" promul-
gated by the FCC were maintained under id. § 402(a) in National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The Court referred to the holdings
of National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 447 (1942) and Columbia
Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). In the latter case
the Court said at 417: "The regulations are not any the less reviewable because
their promulgation did not operate of their own force to deny or cancel a license.
It is enough that failure to comply with them penalizes licensees . . . . If an
administrative order has that effect it is reviewable and it does not cease to be
so merely because it is not certain whether the Commission will institute proceed-
ings to enforce the penalty incurred under its regulations for non-compliance."
15. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (Supp. III,
1958).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (7) (1958).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (5) (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (5) (Supp.
III, 1958).
18. Prime examples of the Commission's broad and comprehensive announce-
ments of policies are FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST Li-
CENSEES (March 7, 1946), known as the BLUE BOOK [hereinafter cited as BLUE
BOOK] and 1960 Report. These publications contain proposals, some of which
have been later made into rules. One can merely speculate as to the effect on
programming of the pronouncements which have not been formulated as rules,
since it cannot be assumed that broadcasters conform to every policy proposal,
or that the FCC imposes sanctions in every case of nonconformance.
19. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (1959): "On this foundation, the Com-
mission has gradually built a whole structure of supervising power. Because of
the value of the license and the necessity for periodical renewal, a station is likely
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constitute a means of supervision that is virtually immune to
judicial review and at the same time highly effective because of
the potentially disastrous effects of incurring the Commission's
displeasure. Application for license may be denied for noncon-
formance with a policy if it is made an ad hoc20 rule by its ap-
plication to a particular case. Consequently, licensees generally
adhere to these pronouncements, since they do not choose to risk
the possibility that the Commission will apply the disregarded
policy as an ad hoc rule. An unsuccessful challenge of an ad hoc
rule results in loss of license. In addition, even should the li-
censee succeed in his appeal, litigation is time-consuming and
expensive, thus desirable to avoid from a business standpoint.
The proposition has been aptly put:
"The crucial business fact which accounts for the effective-
ness of the Commission's supervising power is that hardly
any question of program content can be important enough
to cause a station to endanger renewal of its license."'1
In one instance, the prospective transferee of a station agreed
to discontinue all contests and giveaway programs broadcast by
its other stations in response to the Commission's suggestion that
it appeared to be "purchasing" its listening audience. 22 Thus, the
Commission achieved a striking result by merely writing a letter.
Even if the transferee considered recourse to judicial review it
was apparently unwilling to risk it, for in cases of policy pro-
nouncements the "opportunity for judical review is unavailable
except at the prohibitive cost of risking a valuable license. '23
The transferee would have had to risk his license because it has
been held that pronouncements of policy are not "agency ac-
action" by noncompliance, 24 forcing the Commission to deny his
to react to a dictum, a suggestion, a letter, a speech, or an announcement by the
Commission. A dissenting Commissioner recently dubbed the resulting system
'regulation by lifted eyebrow.' "
20. Rule by ad hoc decisions may prove less effective than officially promul-
gated rules, as a licensee affected by the former may successfully argue that the
rule's application be limited to the particular facts of the proceeding in which the
rule was announced, distinguishing his case.
21. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (1959).
22. Miami Broadcasting Co. (WQAM), in 14 PIKE & FISCHER, RADIO REGU-
LATION 125 (1956). The transferee was "of the opinion that all contests, promo-
tions and 'giveaways' carried by its stations were legal and well within the Com-
mission's Rules and Regulations, and that its programming was in the public
interest." DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (1959).
23. Id. at 73.
24. Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1948) : "[T]he
Administrative Procedure Act does not provide judicial review for everything done
by an administrative agency .... Broad as is the judicial review provided by the
... Act, it covers only those activities included within the statutory definition of
[Vol. XXIII.
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"1agency action" before judicial review is available to him.25
Therefore, the transferee would have had to precipitate "agency
action" by non-compliance, forcing the Commission to deny his
license by rule ad hoc.
By the "lifted eyebrow" the Commission may assert broad
new policies with which broadcasters must comply or risk ap-
plication of the policy by ad hoc rule. In the event of noncon-
formance, the Commission is not committed to invoke disregard-
ed policy as an ad hoc rule and subject sweeping policy to the
test of judicial review. Thus rule-making, which affords oppor-
tunity for judicial review, may be restricted to proposals not
involving major constitutional questions.
THE NEED FOR QUALITY CONTROL OF BROADCASTING
Broadcasting is unique in that effective use of the frequency
spectrum is limited by its very nature to a few broadcasters. Un-
regulated use of frequencies would result in broadcasting chaos
and ultimate destruction of broadcasting's great value as a pub-
lic service.26 Because applicants exceed available frequencies,
licensing has become highly selective.2 7 Broadcasters vie for use
'agency action.' That definition obviously does not cover an act such as the pub-
lication of the Blue Book."
25. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1958) : "Right
of Review.- Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant
statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof."
Id. § 1001(g) : The Act defines agency action as "the whole or part of every
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act."
26. Prior to enactment of the Radio Act of 1927, the Attorney General ren-
dered an opinion that the Secretary of Commerce "had no authority to assign
wave lengths, specify hours of operation, limit the power to be used, or limit the
duration of a license. [35 Ops. Atty. Gen. 126 (1926).]" Rosenbloom, Authority
of the Federal Communications Commission, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
BBO;DCASTING 112 (Coons ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. All
attempt was then abandoned to regulate broadcasting and "the ensuing chaos on
the airways is the phenomenon which has been called 'the breakdown of the [Radio
Act of 1912].' " Ibid. When Congress reconvened in December, 1926, President
Coolidge spoke: " 'Due to the decisions of the courts, the authority of the depart-
ment under the law of 1912 has broken down; many more stations have been
operating than can be accommodated within the limited number of wavelengths
available; further stations are in course of construction; many stations have de-
parted from the scheme of allocation set down by the department, and the whole
service of this most important public function has drifted into such chaos as seems
likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.' [H. Doe. No. 483, 69th Cong.,
2nd Sess., p. 10.]" Id. at 113.
27. Memorandum 156: "'Since the number of channels is limited and the num-
ber of persons desiring to broadcast is far greater than can be accommodated, the
Commission must determine from among the applicants before it which of them
will, if licensed, best serve the public. In a measure, perhaps, all of them give
more or less service. Those who give the least, however, must be sacrificed for those
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of frequencies, the Communications Act having provided them
with the weapon - "programming in the public interest" - so
that those who better meet the statutory criterion stand the
greater chance of receiving licenses.2 8 In addition, the audience
is captive, in that their choice of programs is limited.
The Commission has implemented its statutory authority29 by
continually making various rules designed to improve the qual-
ity of programming. Of these, the rule requiring "balanced pro-
gramming" is the most important. 0 This criterion has been
gradually modified and refined to secure greater program serv-
ice from broadcasters. 1 Programs which are obscene, profane,
or defamatory, and thus inimical to the public interest, have long
been grounds for denial of licenses.8 2  The Commission has re-
who give the most. The emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the
convenience, and the necessity of the listening public, and not on the interest, con-
venience, or necessity of the individual broadcaster or the advertiser.' (Second
Annual Report, Federal Radio Commission, 1928, pp. 169-170.]."
28. Broadcasters not only compete among themselves, but they constantly com-
pete on an individual basis with users of that portion of the frequency spectrum
designated for nonbroadcasting station use. (Memorandum 166, n. 46 points out
the importance of nonbroadcasting use of the spectrum.) Thus, it would seem
broadcasters must justify the appropriation of their total broadcasting spectrum
to them through a high standard of public service.
29. The Commission is, among other things, authorized to "make such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of" the Commu-
nications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (Supp. 1962). From Section 303(g) it would
seem the Commission was given the role of a promoter of the use of radio as a
medium of communication, as the section states the Commission shall "study new
uses for radio ... and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest."
30. EDELMAN, THE LICENSING OF RADIO SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES,
1927 to 1947, 77 (1950) : The "balanced programming" standard is designed to
insure that " '... the tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among
the listening public should be met, in some fair proportion .... ' " The rule en-
compasses " 'a well-rounded program, in which entertainment, consisting of music
of both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, important
public events, discussions of public questions, weather, market reports, and news,
and matters of interest to all members of the family find a place.' In the Matter
of Application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Company et al., in Federal Radio
Commission, Third Annual Report (1929), p. 34." Ibid.
BLUE BOOK 12. Since 1928 "balanced programming" has been included in
license application forms.
31. BLuE BOOK 55-56: An example of a refinement of "balanced program-
ming" : in speaking of its role regarding this the Commission has said: "In issuing
and in renewing the licenses of broadcast stations the Commission proposes to
give particular consideration to four program service factors relevant to the public
interest. These are: (1) the carrying of sustaining programs, including network
sustaining programs, with particular reference to the retention by licensees of a
proper discretion and responsibility for maintaining a well-balanced program
structure; (2) the carrying of local live programs; (3) the carrying of programs
devoted to the discussion of public issues, and (4) the elimination of advertising
excesses. . . .The Commission, in considering overall program balance, will also
take note of network sustaining programs available to but not carried by a sta-
tion, and of the programs which the station substitutes therefor."
32. Broadcasts not in the public interest. Dr. Brinkley established Station
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cently ruled that actual presentations must conform to original
programming proposals.3 3 The latest rule made by the Commis-
KFKB, the Brinkley Hospital, and the Brinkley Pharmaceutical Association.
He personally broadcast the "medical question box" daily, diagnosing and pre-
scribing treatment of cases from symptoms given in letters addressed to either
him or the station. In a typical broadcast he recommended his own prescrip-
tions for the majority of patients. "In its 'Facts and Grounds for Decision,' the
commission held 'that the practice of a physician's prescribing treatment for a
patient whom he has never seen, and bases his diagnosis upon what symptoms
may be recited by the patient in a letter addressed to him, is inimical to the public
health and safety, and for that reason is not in the public interest'; that 'the
testimony in this case shows conclusively that the operation of Station KFKB
is conducted only in the personal interest of Dr. John R. Brinkley. While it is to
be expected that a licensee of a radio broadcasting station will receive some re-
muneration for serving the public with radio programs, at the same time the
interest of the listening public is paramount, and may not be subordinated to
the interests of the station licensee.' " The court was in accord. KFKB Broad-
casting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
Reverend Doctor Shuler owned and operated Station KGEF, which he used
to attack a religious organization, judges of courts having cases pending before
them, the bar asociation for its activities in recommending judges, the board of
health, a labor temple; in general indiscriminately made defamatory statements.
The court upheld denial of his application for license renewal on the ground
that the public interest, convenience, or necessity would not be served by the
grant. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
Other broadcasts held not in the public interest: In re WNAX Broadcasting
Co., 6 F.C.C. 397 (1938) (appeals in behalf of a scheme to solicit funds to be
used to influence legislation pending before Congress) ; In re Radio Broadcasting
Corp., 4 F.C.C. 125 (1937) (analyzing dreams and offering advice on love,
marriage, business, etc.) ; In re Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 76
(1935) (encouraging listeners to use contraceptives) ; In re Application of Mag-
nolia Park, Ltd., F.R.C. Dockets 1570, 1675 (January 20, 1933) (fortune-telling
and advertising astrological charts).
47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1) (D) (1958) gives the Commission authority to sus-
pend the license of any operator for transmitting communications containing pro-
fane or obscene words, language, or meaning. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 31
U.S.L. WEEK 2082 (1962) (FCC refused renewal license on ground that the
station had devoted a substantial portion of its broadcast time to coarse, vulgar,
and suggestive material).
Defamatory political broadcasts. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1958), as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. III, 1958). Subsection (a) provides that a licensee shall
have "no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
of" Section 315. 47 C.F.R. 3.290(a) (1958) defines a "legally qualified candi-
date." Id. paragraphs (b)-(d) set forth other rules peculiar to such broadcasts.
Paragraphs (e) and (f) (Supp. 1962), set forth other operating requirements.
The United States Supreme Court held that under Section 315(a) a licensee
may not delete material from a candidate's radio speech, even if deemed defama-
tory, but that such licensee is immune from liability for defamatory statements
broadcast over his station by a candidate for public office. Farmers Education &
Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1959).
33. Station KORD's license was renewed for only one year because of dis-
parity between its programming and that originally proposed. In re KORD, Inc.,
30 U.S.L. WEEK 2038 (1961).
With reference to this requirement Chairman Minow has said: "On July 13,
1961, we informed every broadcaster of a change in the Commission's renewal
policy. In the past, we granted renewals even though there had been a substan-
tial failure to live up to the programming representations, where the applicant
upgraded his proposals and gave reliable assurances that these new proposals
would be carried out. This will no longer be the case. We have put our licensees
on notice that 'proposals vs. actual operation' is of vital concern to the Corn-
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sion requires applicants to ascertain their communities' broad-
casting needs and to program accordingly.
4
Notwithstanding existing regulations, areas remain in which
the FCC will doubtless attempt to revamp present broadcasting
service. These have been pointed out by recent statements to the
effect that "violence, murder, mayhem, and sadism on TV
shows" is undesirable,3 5 broadcasters are guilty of censorship,3 6
mission, that licensees are not entitled to any license period in which they do
not in good faith make an effort to deliver on their public-service proposals,
and that if they have not been endeavoring in good faith to discharge their rep-
resentations, they should take immediate steps to do so." Public Interest 31.
34. 1960 Report 7295: "The principal ingredient of the licensee's obligation
to operate his station in the public interest is the diligent, positive, and con-
tinuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires
of his community or service area, for broadcast service." The Commission listed
the following elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs, and
desires of the community: "(1) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The
Development and Use of Local Talent, (3) Programs for Children, (4) Religious
Programs, (5) Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs (7) Edi-
torialization by Licensees, (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs,
(10) New Programs, (11) Weather and Market Reports, (12) Sports Programs,
(13) Service to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment Programming." Ibid. It
was careful to point out that "the elements set out above are neither all-embracing
nor constant." Ibid. The report continued: "To enable the Commission in its
licensing functions to make the necessary public interest finding, we intend to
revise PART IV of our application forms to require a statement by the applicant,
whether for new facilities, renewal or modification, as to: (1) The measures he
has taken and the effort he has made to determine the tastes, needs and desires
of his community or service area, and (2) the manner in which he proposes to
meet those needs and desires." Ibid.
Although PART IV has not been officially revised, a sole broadcaster seeking
a construction permit for a new class A FM station was denied his permit on
the ground that his proposal was not designed to meet his area's needs. The Com-
mission stated that the application made no showing of the area's programming
needs, so that determining whether his proposal could be expected to meet those
needs was impossible. Suburban Broadcasters, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2023 (1961),
affirmed on appeal, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1961), on the basis that the FCC
can require a showing that the applicant has ascertained the community's needs
and has programmed to meet them, even though he has established that he is
legally, financially, and technically qualified. Petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was filed June 26, 1962, No. 212, Henry v. F.C.C. Ques-
tions presented: "(1) Did the FCC's denial of a construction permit, based upon
a finding that the applicant's program proposal was not designed to serve the
community's needs, and that no investigation of such needs had been made, con-
stitute censorship of such proposal, violate Section 326 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, and abridge the First Amendment guarantee of free
speech; (2) does the FCC have statutory authority to inquire into the needs
of an area proposed to 'be served by the applicant, to pass judgment upon the
adequacy of the applicant's proposed programming to meet these needs, and to
deny application for failure to investigate these needs?" 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3043.
35. Public Interest 31: "At the same time, the amount of violence, murder,
mayhem, and sadism on TV shows increases, because in somebody's opinion-
sponsor, agency, network-the ratings need a boost. If this is the public interest,
I can only echo the words of Mark Twain: 'The more you explain it, the less
I understand it.'" Also, with reference to TV, the Chairman has said: "You
will see a procession of . .. blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder,
western badmen, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, [and] more vio-
lence . . . ." Address 7792.
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respectable minority interests must be served,37 substituting "old
movies" for network public service programs during free hours
of programming is no longer to be condoned,38 television is a
"vast wasteland."3 9 The Commission's means of preventing such
practices is, of course, to refuse to license any station that em-
ploys them. A cursory examination of the effect of present rules
reveals their inability to remedy the aforementioned problem
areas of broadcasting ;40 more dynamic rules must be made to
remedy these problems.
Any effort by the Commission to improve programming by
pre-empting the field of broadcaster responsibility for quality is
bound to be met with charges of censorship and violation of free
speech. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine rules likely to
be adopted by the Commission in order to determine how far it
may constitutionally go in its attempt to revamp broadcasting
service in the problem areas. The general issue is whether the
Commission would be within its statutory and constitutional
authority to deny licenses on the basis of rules reflecting its own
standards of quality in programming. To elucidate this issue
36. Public Interest 17: "[T]here is . . . censorship connected with 'ratings'
and the almost desperate compulsion of some of our licensees to work and to plan
and to live by the numbers-always striving to reach the largest possible audience,
in order to attract and hold the mass advertising dollar."
Another form of censorship referred to by the Chairman "is what Clare Booth
Luce has called 'dollar censorship.' Here, the broadcast licensee simply abdicates
his own judgment and turns programming decisions over to an advertiser or
his agency." Ibid.
37. Ibid.: "The First Amendment embodies the fundamental idea that minority
views will and must find their place in a free market of ideas and communication.
When the broadcaster ignores minority tastes and serves only the majority which
the advertiser seeks (and this sometimes means rejecting a program which many
millions of people want to see), he is unconsciously rejecting one, of the funda-
mental concepts upon which our society is based and upon which, to quote
Judge Learned Hand, 'we have staked our all.' And in so doing, he is using
public property as a trustee for the public."
38. Address 7793: "[S]tations taking network service should also be required
to report the extent of the local clearance of network public service programming,
and when they fail to clear them, they should explain why. If it is to put on
some outstanding local program, this is one reason. But, if it is simply to
carry some old movie, that is an entirely different matter. The Commission
should consider such clearance reports carefully when making up its mind about
the licensee's overall programming."
39. See note 11 supra.
40. Proscription of obscenity does not encompass violence, balanced program-
ming fails to insure service to the respectable minority, programming proposed
in light of the community's needs as ascertained by the broadcaster imposes no
obligation whatsoever to broadcast network public service programs, broadcasting
according to a proposal offers no remedy for alleged censorship by broadcasting
and advertising industries, and in general the "vast wasteland" appears to be
a matter of taste, the responsibility for which has heretofore been the broad-
casters'.
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while attempting to resolve it, each problem area will be indi-
vidually examined.
FCC AUTHORITY TO PROSCRIBE PROGRAMS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIT OF FREE SPEECH
The Commission might make a rule proscribing excessive
violence in programming by enumerating quantitative and quali-
tative standards; greater than a maximum number of violent
programs or programs containing greater than a permissible de-
gree of violence would be prohibited. An applicant denied a li-
cense on the basis of the rule might appeal on the ground that
the Commission pre-empted his area of discretion in program-
ming and that this area is within the protection of the first
amendment. 41 The narrow constitutional issue would be whether
broadcasting violent programs in a manner prohibited by the
FCC is a right protected by the first amendment guarantee of
free speech.
It would seem that if viewing excessive violence were as ob-
jectionable and as useless to society as obscenity, 42 the Commis-
sion would be well within its statutory authority to limit or
repress it.43 However, since society has not proscribed violent
programming as it has obscenity, it appears that objectionable
qualities of violence, if any, must lie in the harmful effects upon
society of viewing violence. 44 Thus, the Commission has the bur-
den of proving these effects in order to place violence among the
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Censorship would not likely be raised as no prior
restraint is involved; that the Commission can deny licenses on the basis of
past programs is well settled. In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62
F.2d 850, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1932) the court said it was the Commission's "duty
in considering the application for renewal to take notice of appellant's conduct
in his previous use of the permit . . . ." KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v.
FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931) : "In considering an application for a
renewal of the license, an important consideration is the past conduct of the
applicant, for 'by their fruits ye shall know them.' Matt. VII :20." Past pro-
grams have since been considered by the Commission without objection.
42. In disposing of the question whether obscene utterances are within the
area of protected speech, the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 467, 484 (1957) stated: "All ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance . . . have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for
that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be re-
strained ...... The Court further indicated that it was unnecessary to show
the probability of obscenity's inducing persons to antisocial conduct because it
is not protected speech.
43. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1) (D) (1962) (Palmetto case). See note 32 supra.
44. See notes 47-49 infra.
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societal evils not protected by the first amendment, such as ob-
scenity, profanity, and defamation. 45 The Commission's argu-
ment to strip excessive violence of constitutional protection
might be two-fold: (1) that the harm generated is not intended
to be protected by the first amendment; and (2) that the unique
characteristics of broadcasting require extensive regulation.
That a publication merely lacks societal value is not suffi-
cient to remove it from the protection afforded by the first
amendment. Thus, though viewing violence may be valueless to
society, the Commission may not eliminate it for that reason
alone.46 It could be argued that violent programs incite violence
for viewing is analogous to reading, and many reputable per-
sons have contended that reading is "readily translated into be-
havior. ' '47 However, the argument that reading and thus, by
analogy, viewing is of a "small moment in shaping antisocial
tendencies" is equally supportable. 48 In fact, it has never been
conclusively demonstrated that reading or viewing violence pro-
45. See note 32 and last sentence of note 42 supra and note 49 infra and
accompanying text.
46. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948): "Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature. . . . They are
equally subject to control if they are lewd, indecent, obscene or profane." The
analogy of magazines to broadcasts seems sound as both are media of mass com-
munication.
47. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 60-61
(1956) : "The view that reading is readily translated into behavior is shared by
many reputable persons. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, as an example, has been quoted
as contending that 'the increase in the number of sex crimes is due precisely to
sex literature madly presented in certain magazines. Filthy literature is the
great moral wrecker. It is creating criminals faster than jails can be built.' And
Dr. Frederic Wertham, a psychiatrist of high standing, has waged a virtual crusade
against comic books because his clinical observation has convinced him that the
comics have sexually stimulated and emotionally brutalized many children."
48. Id. at 62-63: "So far as disclosed by the most exhaustive study of juvenile
delinquency yet made in America, reading seems to be of small moment in shaping
antisocial tendencies. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck searchingly inquired into
numerous cases to identify the influences that produced delinquency. Reading (if
it was influential at all) was of such slight significance that it was altogether
omitted from their statement of 'factors with probable causal significance.' Judge
George W. Smyth, . . . for many years acclaimed as one of the nation's out-
standing children's court judges, has described to the New York State Temporary
Commission on Youth and Delinquency the causes that had seemingly contributed
to delinquency in cases recently adjudged by him. Reading difficulty was men-
tioned as among the 878 causative factors that had had effect upon the troubled
children before him; reading, no matter of what, found not a single place in
his list.
"Judge Smyth's observation is confirmed by other workers in the field of unde-
sirable juvenile behavior. . . . Far from discovering that delinquency grew out of'
reading, the clinicians have discovered that among New Yorkers it is more
likely to grow out of inability to read."
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motes antisocial behavior.49 It would seem then that the harm
generated is so incapable of ascertainment that it could not be
seriously asserted as a reason for placing violent programming
outside the protection of the first amendment.
The uniqueness of broadcasting has already accounted for
revolutionary regulation of free speech, e.g., licensing of com-
munications media. Its uniqueness certainly affords the Com-
mission powerful arguments to justify its attempt to achieve
higher program quality through reduction of program violence.
The possibility of antisocial tendencies resulting from program
violence coupled with the need for regulation as a result of
broadcasting's uniqueness may be sufficient for the Commission
to restrain violence constitutionally. However, because the guar-
antee of free speech is without a comprehensive definition,50 it is
uncertain at what point the Commission would be infringing
upon it. The United States Supreme Court in National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States-" only slightly clarified the guar-
antee by prohibiting the Commission's choice of licensees on "po-
litical, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious
basis. ' 152 From this it would seem the Commission was left a
wide berth to license on the basis of program quality.- The
amorphous concept of free speech with which regulation through
licensing is involved has been succinctly stated:
49. Id.. at 61: "Such objective evidence as does exist, does not sustain the
fear."50. Desmond, Legal Problems Involved in Censoring the Media of Mass Com-
munication, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 38 (1956) : "It is remarkable and paradoxical
that the United States Supreme Court while deciding during its long history
perhaps two hundred cases directly or indirectly involving freedom of speech,
press and religion has never announced a comprehensive definition of 'freedom
of the press' or indeed, of the other First Amendment freedoms of speech and
religion."
51. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
52. In concerning itself with the first amendment argument that chain broad-
casting regulation abridges the right of free speech, the United States Supreme
.Court said, id. at 226: "If that be so, it would follow that every person whose
application for a license to operate a station is denied by the Commission is
thereby denied his constitutional right of free speech. Freedom of utterance is
abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic, and that is why unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to
use it must be denied. But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose
among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or
upon any other capricious basis."
53. Since the issues of program content and quality were not met in the
National Broadcasting Company case, it could be argued that the narrow limits
placed upon the Commission's licensing power are not applicable to licensing on
the bases of such criteria. It is submitted that such contention is without merit,
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"This enumeration of bases of choice by the Commission
which are proscribed by the First Amendment should not, of
course, be taken to exhaust all conceivable limitations, nor
can the question of the constitutional limits of the Commis-
sion's authority in the programming field be solved on the
basis of this language by the simple statement that any non-
capricious choice by the Commission would be constitutional-
ly sanctioned, but the position that any consideration of pro-
gram content by the Commission violates the First Amend-
ment cannot be maintained in the face of the National Broad-
casting Company case." 4
Whether broadcasting's uniqueness per se will suffice as a
ground upon which the Commission could remove excessive vio-
lence from broadcasting is, in view of the impact that such regu-
lation will have on the first amendment freedom of speech, un-
clear and at best doubtful. It is submitted that if such regula-
tion were permitted simply on the ground that broadcasting is
unique, there would no longer be any constitutional restraint of
regulation and the industry would be wholly subservient to the
FCC. In a situation analogous to broadcasting, the United States
Supreme Court stated that even if movies possess a greater ca-
pacity to produce evil than other communications media, it does
not necessarily follow that they are to be denied the protection
of the first amendment.55 It would seem to follow that if violent
broadcasting is proved harmful, it is not, even then, to be sub-
jected to unqualified control, but merely to enough control to
repress its proven antisocial effects.
In short, it seems that until more conclusive proof can be
made of antisocial effects of violent programs, regulatory at-
tempts to eliminate them must fail as infringements upon the
first amendment guarantee of free speech.
CENSORSHIP BY BROADCASTING AND ADVERTISING
INDUSTRIES: PERMISSIBLE FCC INTERVENTION
At a recent conference on freedom and responsibility in
broadcasting the Chairman of the FCC stated that "there is
as the Court's language appears to embrace licensing in general. See note 52
8upra.
54. Memorandum 161-62.
55. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The analogy of
movies to television seems appropriate in that both are media of mass communica-
tion and are for the purpose of visual perception.
1962]
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much censorship," and charged licensees with violating the spirit
of the first amendment5" "just as surely as if we [the FCC] had
done it."'57 Broadcasters and advertisers present programs in
response to the majority's tastes and endeavor to suppress ma-
terial objectionable to various interests or groups, as they under-
standably do not want to offend anyone of the listening audi-
ence." It is also probably true that to reach a greater audience
broadcasters select commercial programs with high ratings in
preference to network public service programs. These practices
are not astonishing, considering the free-enterprise atmosphere
in which these industries compete for revenue. Should the Com-
mission move into the area of program production to prohibit
suppression of certain information by broadcasters and adver-
tisers, and the making of programming decisions by the latter,
these industries will surely attack the move as being unconstitu-
tional. The question is whether the first amendment safeguards,
or their embodiment in Section 326 of the Communications Act,
would permit such FCC practices and the application of rules
prohibiting suppression and advertiser-programming.
One might surmise that Congress intended for the broadcast-
ing industry to be regulated as a monopoly in view of the act's
criterion for licensing, 59 but this is not so. Notwithstanding
56. Licensees were also charged with violating Section 326 of the Communi-
cations Act. See note 57 infra.
57. Public Interest 16, 17: "There is much censorship. Even as it is defined
here, there is much censorship in broadcasting today. It is as much to be exam-
ined, spotlighted, and at times deplored as any form of censorship by a govern-
ment agency. And since it is done by our own governmental licensees every
broadcast day, it violates the spirit of the First Amendment and Section 326
of the Act just as surely as if we had done it ourselves."
58. Chairman Minow states as a fact that broadcasters substitute commercial
programs for informative programs produced by the networks in order to receive
better ratings. Id. at 17. Also, with reference to testimony elicited at recent
Commission hearings, the Chairman relates: "An electric company wanted a
different title for Kipling's 'The Light That Failed.' And the Civil War drama,
'Ihe Andersonville Trial,' came up on camera as 'The Trial of Captain Wirtz'
because the advertising agency 'wanted to disguise the fact in the South that this
was going to be Andersonville.' What's more, the agency nudged out President
Lincoln's name because Chrysler sponsored the program. As for Edith Wharton's
bleak tragedy, 'Ethan Frome,' the agency inquiry was: 'Couldn't you brighten it
up a little?'" id. at 18.
59. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a), (Supp. 1962). The statutory criterion for
licensing is whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
by issuing the license. The writer has found no significance given the difference
in language between the two sections. Section 307(a) states: "public convenience,
interest, or necessity," while Subsection (d) and Section 309(a) state: "public
interest, convenience, and necessity." See note 60 infra, wherein the criterion is
phrased "public interest, convenience or necessity." It seems doubtful that any
significance should -be given this difference in language since the act and the FCC
in its reports seem to employ either phrase indiscriminately.
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chain broadcasting regulations, broadcasting is a business enter-
prise operating in the realm of free market competition.6 0 That
the first amendment applies to the industry is certain.6 1
The Commission might argue that the broadcaster, in his use
of the airwaves, "is using public property as a trustee for the
public" 62 and is therefore prima facie subject to such regulatory
scrutiny; consequently, the Commission should conduct itself ac-
cordingly in discharging its responsibility to prohibit suppres-
sion of certain information and advertiser-programming. If this
position were sustained it would seem from the holding in KFKB
Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. FRC3 that the Commission would
not have authority to scrutinize and prohibit the suppression of
broadcasting matter, for subjecting broadcasting matter to scru-
tiny prior to its release is censorship.6 4
It appears that denial of a license on the basis of suppression
found by scrutiny after the broadcast has occurred would also
be an unconstitutional interference with the right of free speech,
60. 2 SOCOLOw, THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 1025-26 (1939) [herein-
after cited as LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING] : "Although the operation of a
broadcast station is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission in the
public interest, convenience or necessity, broadcast stations are not public utilities.
On the contrary, they are private enterprises operating within limits defined by
the federal government. Where there are no statutory or administrative restric-
tions on the contents of programs, a broadcast station may establish its own stand-
ards which shall govern and apply to the contents of programs transmitted over
its facilities."
61. Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954),
Justice Douglas concurring: "Motion pictures are of course a different medium
of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the maga-
zine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods
of communicating ideas." (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) : "We
have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in
the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." (Emphasis
added.)
It cannot be successfully argued that because broadcasting is a large-scale
business conducted for private profit the first amendment does not apply to its
form of expression. That production, distribution, and exhibition by motion pic-
tures is a large-scale business conducted for private profit did not remove them
from the aegis of the first amendment. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 502 (1952). The court said: "We fail to see why operation for profit should
have any different effect in the case of motion pictures."
62. Public Interest 17.
63. 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). See note 64 infra.
64. In the KFKB case, supra note 63, the court found no censorship and
stated that "there has been no attempt on the part of the commission to subject
any part of appellant's broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its release."
Id. at 672.
Another argument against the Commission would be that suppression in aid of
free speech is as objectionable as proscribing certain information prior to presenta-
tion. See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
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as this right "was fashioned to assure [the] unfettered inter-
change of ideas." 65
Concerning advertiser-programming, dictum in Simmons v.
FCCs6 indicates that the Commission may constitutionally re-
quire broadcasters to make their own programming decisions.
The Commission's broad discretion to perform its specific func-
tions, recognized in Bay State Beacon v. FCC,57 also might lead
one to conclude that it is authorized to delve into production
areas and programming agreements to determine whether broad-
casters have delegated programming authority to advertisers.
Thus, it is not at all clear that application of a rule prohibiting
programming by advertisers would run afoul of the censorship
provision of the Communications Act.6 8
FCC AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE INFORMATIVE PROGRAMS
The "Balanced Programming" Device
Perhaps a substantial part of the audience does not find
present programming satisfactory, and desires higher quality
and greater diversification; but, as a practical matter, adver-
tisers buy programs which, according to ratings, are received by
more people, and broadcasters sell more time for these programs
because they account for the greatest revenue. The audience re-
65. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (thus, the Court con-
cluded after a brief historical review of the first amendment guarantee of free
speech and press).
66. 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The court said that "censorship would
be a curious term to apply to the requirement that licensees select their own
programs by applying their own judgment to the conditions that arise from time
to time." Id. at 672.
67. 171 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948). To say that the Commission may not
inquire into the amount of sustaining time a prospective licensee purports to
reserve if granted a license without contravening the first amendment or violating
Section 326 of the Communications Act "is to suggest that Congress intended to
create the Commission and then by the very act of its creation, stultify and
immobilize it in the performance of the specific functions that called it into being.
Congress obviously intended no such thing." Id. at 827.
68. LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 1008-09. The censorship provision: "The
prohibition against censorship by the Commisison was criticized in the House of
Representatives as not extensive enough in scope to forbid private censorship of
the content of broadcast programs. It was regarded as axiomatic to allow freedom
of the press and therefore considered dangerous for Congress to supervise by
indirection the expression of opinion in broadcast programs.
"Section 326 may therefore be considered a statutory reiteration of the Con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of speech in the regulation of broadcasting
by the Commission. The failure to enact prohibitions against the regulation of
defamatory broadcasts or the control of censorship of programs by broadcast
station would seem to support this analysis."
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ceives these programs or none at all. For those who choose none
at all for asserted lack of quality, the Commission might adopt
a subtle approach toward improving programming by refining
"balanced programming," e.g., dividing existing categories into
a greater number of more definitive ones: whereas a percentage
of total broadcast time was formerly appropriated merely to
entertainment, it might be divided into classical, dramatic, com-
ical, and musical entertainment. "Balanced programming" has
become firmly entrenched in the Commission's array of rules
since it was held in the KFKB case 69 that "the commission is
necessarily called upon to consider the character and quality of
the service to be rendered."" ° Consequently, it is submitted that
the Commission would encounter little if any difficulty should
it refine "balanced programming." 1
It appears that the Commission could not successfully apply
a rule requiring certain categories of "balanced programming"
to contain specific programs, since prescription of programming
appears as offensive to the guarantee of free speech as proscrip-
tion.7 2
FCC Power to Prescribe Informative Programming
in the Interest of the Public
It has been held that a licensee who subscribes to network
service may accept or reject network broadcasts at will.7 3 He
might refuse a public service program offered by the network
in order to broadcast a commercial program of local interest.
The Commission might, however, take cognizance of the station's
choice and deny him a license upon renewal application. If a
69. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n Inc. v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
70. Id. at 672.
71. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. To date, modifications or
refinements of the standard of "balanced programming" appear to have provoked
no constitutional controversy.
72. 1960 Report 7293: "[T]he First Amendment forbids governmental inter-
ference asserted in aid of free speech, as well as governmental action repressive
of it." The idea is that licensees will not be required to present specific programs
on the erroneous theory that such action would constitutionally enhance freedom
of expression rather than unconstitutionally abridge it.
73. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). After
having stated it to be the licensee's duty to determine what programs to broad-
cast, the Court stated: " 'We conclude that a. licensee is not fulfilling his obliga-
tions to operate in the public interest, and is not operating in accordance with the
express requirement of the Communications Act, if he agrees to accept programs
on any basis other than his own reasonable decision that the programs are satis-
factory.'" (Quoting from FCC REPORT ON CHAIN BRoADCASTIMNG, May 2, 1941.)
Id. at 206.
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license were denied on this basis 74 the licensee would probably
contest the decision on the ground that the Commission violated
his right of free speech by, in effect, prescribing network pro-
grams in lieu of local interest presentations. The FCC could
argue that the public's interest in informative network programs
transcends any constitutional limitation on prescription of pro-
gramming. The issue is the Commission's authority to prescribe
informative network programs in the public interest.
It has been said that the statutory criterion of public interest
is not so "indefinite as to confer an unlimited power.175 The cri-
terion "is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment
in such a field of delegated authority permit,176 yet "in the con-
text of the developing problems to which it was directed, the
Act gave the Commission not niggardly but expansive powers. ' 77
The only limitations placed by the United States Supreme Court
on the Commission's authority to regulate in the public interest
are found in FCC v. Sanders7 and the National Broadcasting
Company case.79 The limitation placed on FCC supervision over
programs, business management and policy in the former case
74. He may well be denied a license on this basis. Chairman Minow used
just such a case in his example of censorship practices. "The networks produce
some magnificent informative programming. The need for this kind of program-
ming is both urgent and obvious in view of the many critical subjects in our
troubled times-such as Berlin, Colonialism, Space, Cuba, Medical Care, Edu-
cation. Yet often over half the networks' affiliates won't carry these programs.
Instead, they substitute a commercial program designed to get a better rating.
You can be sure that their schedules aren't overbalanced with public-service pro-
gramming. It's simply that too often when presented with public service of a
high caliber, these 'trustees' choose to reject their opportunity to serve that
smaller audience numbering sometimes in the millions." Public Interest 17.
75. FRC v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933).
The case involved allocation to an Indiana station of a frequency previously
assigned to two Illinois stations. As to licensing the Court said: ". . . the Com-
mission is required to act 'as public convenience, interest or necessity requires.'
This criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite as
to confer an unlimited power. . . . The requirement is to be interpreted by its
context, by the nature of radio transmission and reception, by the scope, charac-
ter and quality of services, and, where an equitable adjustment between States
is in view, by the relative advantages in service which will be enjoyed by the
public through the distribution of facilities." Ibid.
76. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). The Court
did state, however, that the statutory criterion "serves as a supple instrument
for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to
carry out its legislative policy." The whole idea of the Communications Act was
said to be to give sufficient "flexibility" to the administrative process "to adjust
itself" to the "rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broad-
casting." The act "expresses a desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through
appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio trans-
mission." One may well conclude that the concrete criterion is not hardened.
77. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
78. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
79. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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is merely by way of dictum, as the Court was specifically con-
cerned with an economic question ;o and the latter case simply
prohibited choice among applicants essentially "upon any . . .
capricious basis." ' From these assertions standing alone one
may reasonably conclude that the wide discretion given the Com-
mission includes the power to make a rule requiring licensees to
give preference to network public interest programs. Neverthe-
less, "the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press,
like the First Amendment's command, do not vary .... they...
make freedom of expression the rule, '8 2 and any rule made by
the FCC must be viewed in light of these principles.
It is submitted that a rule requiring licensees to give pref-
erence to network public service programs rather than local in-
terest programs would go beyond those criteria formerly sus-
tained to achieve improved program service, e.g., "balanced pro-
gramming," and thus infringe upon the guarantee of free speech.
The Commission would in effect be prescribing particular pro-
grams, which would appear to be unconstitutional regardless of
the public interest factor.3
CONCLUSION
It may be that present-day programming is poor, and that
widespread dissatisfaction exists. The "vast wasteland" of pro-
80. This was the first time in the history of the Communications Act that a
court recognized such a comprehensive limitation as the following: "But the
Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licensee. The Commission is
given no supervisory control of the programs, of business management or of policy.
In short, the broadcasting field is open to anyone, provided there be an available
frequency over which he can broadcast without interference to others, if he shows
his competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability to make
good use of the assigned channel." 309 U.S. at 475. The Court itself limited this
sweeping statement: "The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a
license. Licenses are limited to a maximum of three years' duration, may be
revoked, and need not be renewed. Thus the channels presently occupied remain
free for a new assignment to another licensee in the interest of the listening
public." Ibid. In view of the Nelson Brothers and Pottsville cases, notes 75 and
76 supra, it does not seem that the Court desires to limit the Commission, al-
though one may infer the contrary from its previous statement. Reference to
"not niggardly but expansive powers" in the NBC case seems to eliminate any
doubt as to the weight to be given the sole statement of limitation in the
Sanders case.
With respect to this statement Joel Rosenbloom said: "It is highly improbable,
to say the least, that by this general dictum in a case not raising the question
of programming the Supreme Court intended to sweep away some thirteen years
of administrative, judicial and legislative history under the Communications Act."
Memorandum 157.
81. 319 U.S. at 226. See last sentence of note 52 supra.
82. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
83. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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gramming seems unquestionably a matter of taste, unimprov-
able by the Commission's present rules. For years broadcasters
have responded to the subtle approach to regulation -various
forms of policy pronouncements -and the Commission's rules
have remained virtually unchanged, thus provoking no litigation
of constitutional issues. But broadcasters' failure to improve
present program quality invites increased regulation by the FCC.
Experience has shown that broadcasters do not ignore policy pro-
nouncements so that the Commission is not forced into rule-mak-
ing. However, when broadcasting freedom faces serious limita-
tion, broadcasters will be less receptive to policy pronounce-
ments. At some point an impasse will be reached. Broadcasters
will balk, no longer responding to the subtle approach, and the
Commission will be forced to make rules incorporating broad
assumptions of authority in its quest to improve program qual-
ity. The result will be litigation involving delicate constitutional
problems of free speech.
If the Commission were to make rules that would attain a
higher degree of quality programming, it appears that it would
have a very difficult time sustaining them before the Court in
view of the existing interpretation of the free speech guarantee.
Perhaps the key to improved programming quality lies in the
following statement by Chairman Minow: "To those few broad-
casters and their professional associates who would evade the
nation's needs by crying, 'Censorship! Oh, where will it end?' I
ask, 'Responsibility! When will it begin?'- 84
David S. Bell
CLASSIFYING MINERAL INTERESTS-
MINERAL SERVITUDE V. MINERAL ROYALTY
In Louisiana jurisprudence the distinction between the rights
and obligations that accompany an ordinary mineral royalty and
those that accompany an ordinary mineral servitude is well set-
tled.' Many conveyances or reservations of mineral interests,
84. Public Interest 33.
1. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575
(1960) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Hum-
ble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947) ; Union Sulphur
Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947); St. Martin Land Co. v.
Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1,
187 So. 35 (1939).
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